发展竞争、土地供应策略互动与城市用地增长——基于252个城市数据的空间面板模型实证检验

研究目的：针对发展竞争驱动下产生的地方政府土地供应策略，从空间维度上展开进一步分析，解析城市土地供应行为中存在着怎样的空间互动关系。研究方法：运用2007—2017年的城市层面面板数据和空间计量模型进行了实证检验。研究结果：（1）服务于发展竞争的土地供应策略，对本城市和周边城市的用地增长都会产生影响；（2）工业用地价格波动与商住用地价格波动都会产生空间溢出效应，且前者产生的空间溢出效应更强；（3）工业用地价格存在“竞次式”的城市间互动，其价格增长会显著抑制本城市的用地扩张，但会促进周边城市的用地增长；（4）商住用地价格提升会促进本城市用地扩张，并抑制周边城市用地扩张；（5）作为因变量的城市用地规模，在同省/异省的城市间分别存在着“彼此促进”和“此消彼长”两种互动关系。研究结论：区域协调、用地增长两个方面要紧密结合，针对工业用地价格“竞次式”竞争和商住用地价格高价出让，从城市间关系协调入手进行调控政策的设计与创新。     

领导干部自然资源资产离任审计与企业绿色并购——来自中国重污染型上市公司的经验证据

基于2011~2017年我国A股重污染型上市公司经验数据，实证检验了领导干部自然资源资产离任审计对企业绿色并购行为的影响，研究发现：领导干部自然资源资产离任审计可显著促进辖区内企业实施绿色并购；而当地区市场竞争程度越高时，越会抑制企业在领导干部自然资源资产离任审计试点实施背景下的绿色并购扩张行为；进一步地，企业绿色并购会显著提高企业价值，且这一影响对并购后当年的企业价值影响最为显著；基于异质性分析方面，领导干部自然资源资产离任审计会约束不同产权性质企业的环境治理行为，促进其采取绿色并购，实施绿色发展；同时领导干部自然资源资产离任审计会更有利于东部地区企业实施绿色并购，而对中西部地区的企业影响不明显。     

Who benefits from partial tax coordination?

In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states. This is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is Pareto improving. When a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union, we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries. Moreover, both the high‐tax and low‐tax countries can be worse off. This conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high‐tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound.     

Are microfinance markets monopolistic?

Do microfinance institutions (MFIs) operate in a monopoly, monopolistic competition environment or are their revenues derived under perfect competition markets? We employ the Panzar–Rosse revenue test on a global panel data to assess the competitive environment in which MFIs of five selected countries operate: Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru and Philippines, over the period 2005–2009. We estimate the static and the dynamic revenue tests, with analyses of the interest rate and the return on assets. We control for microfinance-specific variables such as capital-assets-ratio, loans-assets and the size of the MFI. The analyses also account for the endogeneity problem by employing the fixed-effects two-stage least squares and the fixed-effects system generalized method of moments. Our results suggest that MFIs in Peru and India operate in a monopolistic environment. We also find weak evidence that the microfinance industry in Ecuador, Indonesia and Philippines may operate under perfect competition.     

Banks' environmental policy and business outcomes: The role of competition

By integrating the two areas of competition–performance and environment–performance, this research explores if competition matters in the relationship between environmental practices and interest margins in the market. A panel of 458 banks from 74 countries for the period of 2006–2016 is used, and the sample is further divided into developed and developing countries. This paper uses the system Generalized Method of Moments estimator to tackle potential omitted variable bias, endogeneity, and simultaneity issues. Without competition, environmental practices only affect banks in developing countries; however, the results show a significant impact for the full sample, including developed countries, when the competition is taken into consideration, suggesting that competition might play a role in the relationship of environmental practices and interest margins. In the full sample, competition impacts the relationship negatively after a moderate level of competition is reached in the market. The environmental practices in developing countries are prone to competition in the market. In developed countries, the competition is found to be lightly positively moderating the impact of environmental practices on interest margins. Based on these findings, it is recommended that developing countries should have a low or moderate level of competition to encourage environmental practices. For developed countries, however, high competition should be preferred to encourage banks to consider environmental practices as one of their core business strategies. These findings are found robust to different statistical estimators.     

Using word of mouth data from social media to identify asymmetric competition in food retailing

Competition between food retailers is often assumed to be asymmetrical, whereby one retailer may compete with another retailer but not vice versa. Little is known about how (a)symmetric competition among retailers currently is. One way to investigate this is to use word of mouth data. A mixed methods analysis of customer comments on social media confirms the existence of asymmetric competition among German food retailers, mainly between supermarkets and discounters. Overall, consumers compare competitors frequently on the basis of their assortments, the price-performance ratio as well as quality and freshness. The results have implications for competition policy and strategic management.     

粤港澳大湾区制造业集聚与区域创新

以2009—2020年粤港澳大湾区11个城市为研究对象，探讨制造业集聚与区域创新的关系。研究发现，制造业集聚显著提高区域创新水平，可通过提高企业竞争这一路径实现。进一步分析发现，金融业集聚对区域创新发展具有显著的正向关系，金融产业和制造业产融协同集聚显著提高区域创新水平。研究结果表明，制造业集聚加剧产业内部企业创新竞争，带动区域创新发展，且金融业在创新中起到积极的推动作用。指出应鼓励区域企业创新竞争，优化营商环境，为产业融合发展提供保障。     

银行业市场竞争对企业技术创新的影响研究

银行贷款是企业创新的重要融资来源,银行业市场的变化影响着企业技术创新的融资环境.基于2008-2014年沪深A股上市公司的实证检验发现:银行市场竞争性的提高有利于缓解企业的融资约束,促进企业技术创新.企业规模对中小企业的技术创新有正向的影响,对大型企业存在负的效应.银行业市场竞争对企业技术创新的影响也因企业规模不同而不同,中小企业受到的融资约束明显,银行业竞争度的提高更有利于促进中小企业的技术创新.     

Optimal insurance in the presence of reinsurance

This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyholder, insurer, and reinsurer. We assume that the preferences of the parties are given by distortion risk measures, which are equivalent to dual utilities. By maximizing the dual utility of the insurer and jointly solving the optimal insurance and reinsurance contracts, it is found that a layering insurance is optimal, with every layer being borne by one of the three agents. We also show that reinsurance encourages more insurance, and is welfare improving for the economy. Furthermore, it is optimal for the insurer to charge the maximum acceptable insurance premium to the policyholder. This paper also considers three other variants of the optimal insurance/reinsurance models. The first two variants impose a limit on the reinsurance premium so as to prevent insurer to reinsure all its risk. An optimal solution is still layering insurance, though the insurer will have to retain higher risk. Finally, we study the effect of competition by permitting the policyholder to insure its risk with an insurer, a reinsurer, or both. The competition from the reinsurer dampens the price at which an insurer could charge to the policyholder, although the optimal indemnities remain the same as the baseline model. The reinsurer will however not trade with the policyholder in this optimal solution.